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 Is there a relationship between the increase in both U.S. foreign aid and human rights violations 
in Ecuador from 1984 to 1988? If so, which causal mechanisms are present in the case of 
Ecuador?  The ambition of this thesis is to contribute to the development of literature on the 
relationship between foreign aid and human rights in International Relations as well as the 
motives for state repression in democracies. To perform this investigation, first I will present a 
review of the different literature on the relationship between human rights and foreign aid. Then 
I will present the proposed explanatory theoretical model and causal mechanisms. I will present a 
case study on human rights in Ecuador from 1984 to 1992, with a deep analysis of 1984 to 1988. 
Afterwards, I will test the congruence of each causal mechanism to ascertain whether the 
hypotheses in the proposed theoretical framework are present. I will conclude with a summary of 
the findings as well as remarks on the limitations of the study and recommendations for further 
research.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980’s scholars have dedicated their research to the understanding of the 
relationship between human rights and foreign aid. Given the millions of human rights victims 
around the globe, and the continued use of aid as a foreign policy tool, it is important to 
understand this relationship. As issues in global governance become increasingly complex, 
knowing the potential impact of international aid on the domestic human rights situation of a 
country can be helpful for policy makers making decisions on aid allocation. Similarly, 
understanding the domestic conditions that impact human rights may help local officials create 
policies that prevent the causes of violations. To understand contemporary human rights 
situations it is valuable to first study the historical connection to foreign aid.  
Traditionally, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has 
been an important foreign policy tool for the United States (U.S.) as means of securing peace and 
reducing terrorist attacks domestically (USAID 2002). In the 1960’s foreign aid to Latin America 
was the top priority for the U.S.  government to ensure there were no anti-U.S. or pro-
Communism movements (Taffet 2007:2). Since then, recipients of USAID in Latin America 
have had varying human rights conditions throughout the years. Latin America was the region 
where anti-Communism and human rights, two components of the U.S. identity, clashed unlike 
any other region(Sikkink 2004:88). As a neighbor, Latin America was a battleground for the war 
against Communism and the Nixon Administration, especially,  was accused of ignoring the 
mass human rights violations and supporting repressive dictatorships to maintain influence in the 
region(Taffet 2007:9).  
One of the frontlines was Ecuador given its tendency to elect left leaning regimes, it was 
considered of special interest(Carleton and Stohl 1985:223). During the Cold War era, Ecuador 
experienced a time of political instability with a series of military coups between 1960 and 1979 
(Hanratty and Weil 1991:31-45). Although democratic rule was restored in 1979 the pattern of 
state-initiated human rights violations continued well after this time.  In the 1980’s democracy 
was frail and the newly elected governments faced a great challenge from Ecuador’s greatest 
economic crisis. In 1984 León Febres Cordero, the right wing candidate, was elected president 
by a small margin. From 1984 to 1988 the elected Ecuadorian government utilized state 
repression as a means of consolidating power, gaining greater domestic authority, and 
establishing neoliberal policies. During this time, the Ecuadorian state led repressive campaigns 
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against both armed and unarmed movements or individuals opposing the government(Comisión 
de la Verdad 2010). From 1984 to 1988, there was an increase in human rights violations which 
included extrajudicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment and torture.  Despite the 
international public awareness of these abuses and the U.S.’ support of universal human rights, 
President Ronald Reagan did not denounce these actions. USAID to Ecuador increased during 
this time and Reagan was accused of overlooking these abuses because of his sympathy towards 
Cordero’s conservative government(Riding 1988).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. USAID & Human Rights Violations (HRV) in Ecuador from 1981-1990. (Sources: Data for USAID 
from Greenbook. Data for human rights 1981-1983 from CIRI human rights data
1
  and 1984-1990 from 
Comisión de la Verdad, pg. 55). 
 
 
Figure 1. displays the U.S. aid allocation and the Ecuadorian state-initiated human rights 
violations from 1980 to 1990. During this ten year span, there is a distinct increase in U.S. aid to 
Ecuador beginning in 1984 and peaking in 1986. Similarly, human rights violations increase 
starting in 1984 and decrease sharply in 1988. The peak of human rights violations is in 1987, 
sometime after the increase in U.S. aid. This temporal change indicates an empirical correlation 
                                                          
1
 Utilized because there is no data on human rights violations prior to 1984 in Comisión de la Verdad Report 
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between U.S. aid and human rights, however the processes and causal mechanisms remain 
unknown. The graph challenges conventional scholarship which asserts that democracies are less 
likely to engage in acts of state repression(Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994).  
 If USAID and human rights violations increased in Ecuador during these four years, what 
were the causes? The increase in both occurrences requires an investigation into how the 
Ecuadorian government utilized the money, more specifically, whether it was used for repressive 
acts from the state that resulted in human rights violations. Academic works primarily focus on 
large-N research that aim to empirically prove whether foreign aid increases or decreases human 
rights violations in recipient countries (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 
1985; McCormick and Mitchell 1988;Schoultz 1981) . However, few works identify the causal 
mechanisms between foreign aid and human rights abuses in recipient countries (Regilme Jr. 
2014:2). One theory which aims to identify the causal mechanisms of variances in human rights 
violations in the global South is interest convergence by Regilme (2014a).  
The intellectual curiosity behind this thesis is to find out why there was an increase in 
human rights violations during this era in Ecuador’s history. To this end, the research puzzle for 
this thesis is: Is there a relationship between the increase in both U.S. foreign aid and human 
rights violations in Ecuador from 1984 to 1988? If so, which causal mechanisms are present in 
the case of Ecuador?  The ambition of this thesis is to contribute to the development of literature 
on the relationship between foreign aid and human rights in international relations as well as the 
motives for state repression in democracies. To perform this investigation, first I will present a 
review of the different literature on the subject matter. Then I will present the proposed 
explanatory theoretical model and causal mechanisms. Afterwards, I will focus on explaining the 
methods employed to ensure rigorous academic standards and outcomes in the research. Section 
5, will present the case study of Ecuador from 1984 to 1992, with a deep analysis of 1984 to 
1988. Section 6, will consist of the congruence testing of each causal mechanism to ascertain 
whether the hypotheses in the proposed theoretical framework were accurate. Finally, Section 7 
will provide a summary of the findings as well as remarks on the limitations of the study and 
recommendations for further research.  
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2. HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN AID 
The connection between U.S. Foreign Aid and human rights practices in recipient 
countries has been a concern of comparative politics in the last forty years. This question has 
been an important aspect of global governance since the founding work by Lars Schoultz (1981) 
which suggested that that aid is also given to states with poor human rights records. Subsequent 
studies are divided in two chief camps of scholarship, those who argue that there is a positive 
relationship between U.S. Foreign Aid and human rights violations in recipient states and those 
who contend that there is a negative relationship and that the U.S. gives aid to countries that 
comply with human rights.  Studies are conducted on the global, regional and local scales with 
varying results at each level. 
Recently scholars have been focusing on large-N studies, with many countries, in an 
attempt to find a global pattern. Neumayer (2003) finds that there is no difference between 
donors that are committed to human rights and those that are not, meaning donor countries do 
not allocate more aid to recipient countries with better human rights compliance records, even 
those that claim to be sensitive to human rights. However, a substantial amount of literature finds 
that abusive regimes receive more aid (Carleton and Stohl 1985:1987; Schoultz 1981). In 
particular, during the 1970’s, the pattern of U.S. aid was disproportionately concentrated towards 
countries with repressive regimes (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Schoultz 1981). Callaway and 
Matthews (2008) find evidence of a variety of contributing factors. During the democratization 
process USAID is harmful to security rights because the elites use aid to suppress the opposition  
(Callaway and Matthews 2008:105). Similarly, in poor recipient countries, elites have a 
perceived threat from the poor masses and are more likely to suppress political 
dissidents(Callaway and Matthews 2008:107).  Additionally, the more that a country depends on 
USAID, as percentage of GDP, the more the rights of their citizens are negatively 
impacted(Callaway and Matthews 2008:110). USAID has a negative impact on the human rights 
situation in recipient countries because national security interests outweigh human rights 
concerns and countries will continue to receive aid regardless of the abuses committed(Callaway 
and Matthews 2008:184). 
A seminal work on the relationship between U.S. aid and human rights in Latin America 
produced controversial results, but nevertheless served as a basis for subsequent studies. 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) conducted a large-N study that found that the U.S. 
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institutionalized human rights considerations in foreign aid allocation to Latin America as a 
result of Congress placing great importance on human rights. A growing body of literature 
questions the validity of this study and demonstrates that the results were either misleading or 
not significant (Carleton and Stohl 1987; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Poe 1992; Poe and 
Sirirangsi 1994). One flaw of the study is that El Salvador was excluded from the study, a 
country which received 25% of USAID during 1982 and had one of the most repressive regimes 
at the time (McCormick and Mitchell 1988). When El Salvador was included, the results failed 
to demonstrate that human rights were an important consideration when the U.S. made aid 
decisions towards Latin America (McCormick and Mitchell 1988). Carleton and Stohl (1987) 
found that the results from Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) held true only when information 
from the State Department was used. When data from other entities was used there were no 
significant results(Carleton and Stohl 1987:1014). Further, when all outliers are included, not 
just El Salvador, the results are less significant than those found by Cingranelli and Pasquarello 
(1985).  
 Another body of literature focuses on the relationship between U.S. aid allocation and 
human rights considerations specifically during the Reagan years, 1981-1989. Several studies 
found that  the Reagan administration allocated aid towards countries that were more human 
rights compliant ( Apodaca and Stohl 1999;Hofrenning 1990). However, this only applied to 
economic aid and not military aid for which human rights compliance was not a determinant. 
When national security interests played a primary role, then recipient governments received aid 
regardless of their human rights records(Apodaca and Stohl 1999). In contrast, Carleton and 
Stohl (1985) find that during the initial years of the Reagan administration, human rights 
concerns did not influence the disbursement of U.S. foreign assistance but rather other priorities 
such as improving political, economic and security objectives(Carleton and Stohl 1985:222). 
Human rights abuses were overlooked if the U.S. had “specific interests”, which included 
countries that were Soviet Union allies, contained U.S. military bases, had major resources in the 
U.S. or were members of Pro-Western security organizations(Carleton and Stohl 1985:223).  Poe 
and Sirirangsi (1994) looked specifically at 1983-1988 and found mixed results on the 
consideration for human rights for aid allocation during this time. Nevertheless there was 
increased aid allocation for Ecuador, Chile and Argentina, all countries with high levels of state 
repression during this time(Jacoby 1986:1069).  
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The aforementioned studies make up a broad range of literature on U.S. aid and human 
rights that only provide large-N quantitative data, but no potential explanations. As such, these 
studies have little explanatory power and do not account for the variances in different cases such 
as country and year. This is evident in the contradictory results which vary depending on the 
scale and timeframe of the study. Furthermore, these studies have focused on the human rights 
situation as the independent variable and aid allocation as the dependent variable. Since these 
studies are unable to provide a general theory to explain the relationship between USAID and 
human rights, then more nuanced theories that provide the potential variances is necessary. More 
recently, research shifted focus towards  investigating the causal processes for variations in U.S. 
aid and human rights violations. 
A new body of literature aims to identify causal mechanisms and utilizes the human 
rights situation as the dependent variable. Alesina and Dollar (2000) posit that foreign aid 
allocation is determined by political and strategic concerns as well as the policy performance and 
policy needs of recipient countries. They argue that political alliances and a colonial past are 
determinants of foreign aid. Sikkink (2004) finds that between 1973 and 1982 there was a decade 
of increased human right violations in Latin America indicating that transnational forces might 
have influenced this trend. Sikkink looks beyond economic and military aid to suggest that 
worldviews conveyed by top-level policy-makers influence domestic decisions about repression.  
However this does not explain why human rights violations in states receiving USAID continued 
well after the 1970’s into contemporary times.  Based on the empirical evidence, there is a well-
establish correlation between the increase in foreign aid and the subsequent increase in human 
rights abuses in Ecuador. The following section will provide a detailed presentation of the 
proposed explanatory theoretical framework.  
 
3. PROPOSED THEORETICAL MODEL 
3.1 Introduction 
  This section proposes an explanatory model for the relationship between U.S. aid and the 
human rights situation in Ecuador from 1984 to 1988. The suggested framework aims to identify 
and explain the processes that lead to this outcome. The model shows how this relationship 
furthered the political interests of both the U.S. (donor) and Ecuadorian (recipient) governments. 
It is composed of both domestic and transnational factors that are interactive and interdependent. 
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The independent variable is economic ideological alignment and the dependent variable is the 
human rights situation in Ecuador. I argue that there are three distinct causal mechanisms that 
resulted in the state repression: (1) political discourse appropriation; (2) expansion of military 
resources & capacity and; (3) removal of ideological opponents. As Figure 1. shows, this is a 
process that occurred over time, thus I argue that this specific combination of developments 
resulted in the outcome.  Components of this theoretical framework are based on 
conceptualizations of causal mechanisms of state repression found in the scholarship and that are 
then redefined in the Ecuadorian context.  
 
3.2 Key Argument and Hypotheses  
There is a well-established empirical correlation between the increase in U.S. foreign aid 
and state-initiated human rights violations between 1984 and 1988. However the potential 
mechanisms between the two remain largely unknown, requiring the building of an explanatory 
theory(Beach and Pedersen 2013:164).  I argue that the ideological alignment of political and 
economic interests from the U.S. and Ecuadorian governments along with the weak authority of 
the Ecuadorian government and the U.S. aid were significant factors in the increase of human 
rights violations. First, I will conceptualize the theoretical concepts into “systemized concepts” 
(Adcock and Collier 2001). Then, I will conceptualize the causal mechanisms that are present in 
the case of Ecuador. Afterwards, I explain how through these mechanisms, increased U.S. aid 
most likely facilitated the rise in state repression over time.  
 
3.3 Independent Variable: Economic Ideological Alignment  
In this thesis the independent variable is the “economic ideological alignment”, a term 
which is composed of three interrelated conditions; an increase in U.S. aid, a weak Ecuadorian 
government, and the radical establishment of neoliberalism. This term is a development of 
Regilme Jr.'s (2014a) interest convergence which is conceptualized as the  mutual interests or 
policy preferences of donor and recipient governments and the actual policies created in the 
recipient country (Regilme Jr. 2014a:19).  In this case, the shared interest was primarily the 
establishment of neoliberal policies in Ecuador.  Economic ideological alignment can be 
conceptualized as the concerted effort of the U.S. to provide aid to countries which implemented 
anti-Communist or neoliberal economic policies coupled with a weak Ecuadorian government 
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that sought to establish neoliberal policies in a radical way. The economic interests reflect that of 
the Ecuadorian elites who helped the government win the elections through financial support. 
Domestic economic elites may support human rights violations by the state because they may 
profit directly(Cardenas 2004:221). Inequality is also a factor of state repression, in poor 
countries especially, elites are more willing to use force in order to maintain their privileges(Gurr 
1985). In this case the elites benefited from the neoliberal policies which would give them access 
to financial rewards. Altogether these conditions make up the independent variable. 
In this framework the term foreign aid or U.S. aid will be used interchangeably. The 
terms are conceptualized as more than just the traditional monetary component. They include 
political support and resources that reflect the agreement of the ideology such as financial 
support, public diplomacy, joint security exercises, sharing of knowledge, as well as 
development programs and public infrastructure etc. (Regilme Jr. 2014a:20). The 
conceptualization of a weak government will be assessed through the following determinants: 
has there been an ongoing low intensity conflict? Did the elected government win by a small 
margin? Does the government have weak authority internally and domestically? Is the opposition 
the majority within the internal government? Is the opposition influential among the public? Is 
there an economic crisis in the country? These are all markers that the government in power is 
weak and aims to use repression as means of consolidating authority(Regilme Jr. 2014a:20-21).  
Radical economic reform refers to the use of authoritarian-like policies and practices to 
institute neoliberalism. Pion-Berlin (1989) found a significant positive relationship between free 
or open market principles and state repression in parts of Latin America. “Bureaucratic-
authoritarianism” is a system in which the elites work with “external patrons” for their benefit at 
the economic and political expense of civil society(O’Donnell 1973). Neoliberalism was 
achieved through the imposition of economic policies and practices that had little support from 
civil society. To manage economic development, “ruling elites” may increasingly resort to 
repression as a means of maintaining the impetus of economic policies that will likely be met 
with dissent(Lopez and Stohl 1989:xi). Given the Ecuadorian civil society’s propensity to elect 
left leaning governments, the establishment of neoliberal policies was more aligned with the 
interests of the U.S. (donor) government and Ecuadorian elites than with the preferences of the 
general population.  
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3.4 Dependent Variable: Human Rights Situation 
Universal human rights are inclusive of political, security and subsistence 
rights(Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens 2007:7). This thesis will only include security rights 
because these are the focal point of this research. State repression and human rights violations 
will specifically include: torture, extrajudicial killings, attempted homicide and forced 
disappearances committed by either military or police personnel. These are chosen for validity 
purposes because they represent the categories covered in the sources of human rights data 
including the Comisión de la Verdad (Truth Commission Report), Ecumenical Commission of 
Human Rights (CEDHU) and America’s Watch Committee. According to Regilme (2014a) 
human rights violations are composed of both intentional and accidental abuses from the state. 
Intended violations are statewide and systematic while collateral or abuses are those that are 
committed as part of erroneous policing methods which result in innocent individuals(Regilme 
Jr. 2014a:39). I will use Lopez and Stohl’s (1992) “events-based approach” to measure human 
rights violations by tabulating the number of abuses each year. Increases in human rights 
violation will be defined as a large quantity of both intentional violations and collateral 
violations from the state. While a decrease in human rights violations will be defined as the 
absence of intentional violations and minimal collateral violations from the state.  
 
3.5 Causal mechanisms, Processes and Explanatory Model  
Literature on the causal mechanisms of state repression in democracies covers a wide 
spectrum of causal mechanisms which are predominantly conflict, regime type and economic 
explanations. Generally the literature has treated the state’s use of force as a cost-benefit 
analysis; when states consider that the benefits exceeds the damage done by the repression, then 
they will choose repression(Poe 2004; Rivera 2010:65). Studies focusing on Latin America aim 
to explain why the region has high levels of state repression despite most countries being 
democracies. Further, both domestic and transnational factors are found to generate variations in 
levels of state repression.  
Scholarship on the “conflict-repression nexus” focuses on the impact of repression on 
dissidents(Davenport and Inman 2012:620). Generally it is established that governments will 
treat any armed group that challenges them, as threat to national security (Cardenas 2004). This 
is in line with Davenport's (2007b) “law of coercive responsiveness”, which states that when the 
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authorities are challenged with any form of conflict and they feel threatened, then they will 
respond with a repressive action. National security threats bring uncertainty, which threatens the 
interests of the government and the economic elites(Cardenas 2004:221). Other than responding 
to threats, the state may use violence as a mechanism through which it advances its interests such 
as political stability (Davenport 1996). Various studies have found a link between civil war or 
international wars and increased state repression ( Davenport 2004, 2009;McCormick and 
Mitchell 1988; Poe and Tate 1994). In situations of war, all types of government use repression 
because the violence threatens the stability of the state ( Davenport 2007a).   
However other studies show that even in situations of less intense conflict there are also 
cases of state repression (Davenport 2004;Moore 2000). When there is ongoing opposition in 
large numbers, governments will respond more violently to organized and armed dissent than 
protest that is spontaneous or non-violent(Carey 2004). In particular guerilla warfare has a 
specific policy aim to change the regime structure, as such it directly threatens the existence of 
the governments and is an acute threat(Carey 2004:217).  In a situation of terrorism, state 
repression can occur when “domestic rules of exception” are implemented and justified by 
leaders as the protection of a “national good”(Cardenas 2004:222). Moore (2000) analyzed the 
impact of dissidence on repression and found that when there is accommodation by the 
government followed by dissent, then the government will respond with repression. Conversely, 
when there is state repression followed by dissidence, then the government will decrease 
repression.  
With regards to regime type it is generally thought that democracies lessen the use of 
state repression, because administrations can find ways in which to solve issues in a peaceful 
manner (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). Furthermore the cost of implementing repression 
in democracies is greater (Davenport 2007a). According to the “domestic democratic peace” 
theory there is a decrease in state repression when democratic institutions go through rigorous 
examination (Davenport 2007b). These studies find that there is a negative relationship between 
democracy and state repression. However a more recent study found that this only applies to 
democracies which have reached a level of 8 in the POLITY index, which is indicative of a 
developed democracy (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). In 1984, Ecuador scored 9 out of 10, 
which would mean that it should have led to less repression, however this was not the 
12 
 
case(Center for Systemic Peace 2014). Munck (2003) finds that in post-transitional democracies, 
state repression is the result of state agencies abusing their power.  
The literature attributing economic reasons for state repression, provide a variety of 
explanations. Studies link economic growth to increase in state repression because it causes 
instability and social conflict(Davenport 2004;McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Poe and Tate 
1994) . To manage economic development, “ruling elites” may increasingly resort to repression 
as a means of establishing economic policies that will likely be met with opposition by civil 
society(Lopez and Stohl 1989:xi). Other studies find that structural economic reforms such as 
those upheld by Bretton Woods institutions aggravate low-intensity conflicts and promote human 
rights repression (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). Moreover states seeking to attract 
multinational corporations will use repression to establish and maintain open market policies and 
political stability (Carleton 1989:220). 
In Latin America, repression is mainly attributed to a weak judiciary system and 
impunity. Studies on temporal and spatial variations in human rights violation in democratic 
Latin American states are almost nonexistent (Rivera 2010:83). However Brinks (2008), argues 
that state repression of democracies in Latin America is due to the impunity of its security 
apparatus because of the inadequate justice systems. Most of the literature focuses on external or 
domestic explanations for state repression. However this thesis takes the approach that variation 
in human rights practices are caused by interactive domestic and transnational factors (Regilme 
Jr. 2014b). Below I illustrate the proposed causal framework which explains the increase of 
human rights violation in Ecuador from 1984-1988:  
 
                      
 
 
 
Figure 2. Causal Mechanisms: Ideological Alignment of Economic Reform and Increased Human Rights Violations 
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I argue that economic ideological alignment by the U.S. and Ecuadorian political elites 
was the preliminary set of conditions. As shown in Figure 2. The causal mechanisms and 
processes which resulted in the dependent variable were: (1) security discourse appropriation; (2) 
expansion of military resources & capacity and; (3) removal of ideological opponents. I argue 
that the León Febres Cordero regime created conditions of a “domestic terror war” to justify state 
repression. However, the actual goal was the establishment neoliberal policies and the survival of 
his regime. To realize these goals, the state resorted to human rights violations as a means of 
consolidating power. The causal mechanisms are conceptualized as follows:  
 
 (1) Security Discourse Appropriation 
Security discourse appropriation refers to the adoption and reconceptualization of global 
security discourse by the recipient government. Security discourses can either contain militaristic 
or less militaristic (supportive of human rights) language. The creation of a military crisis 
justifies increases in state repression domestically(Regilme Jr. 2014a:29). This is achieved by 
national leadership linking a transnational security discourse from the donor government to the 
domestic situation and re-defining it in local terms to further their political agenda(Regilme Jr. 
2014a:29). In the case of Ecuador, the León Febres Cordero Administration used terms from 
Reagan’s war against Communism, terror, and drugs to create a perceived local security threat. 
The guerilla group, Alfaro Vive Carajo (AVC) was labeled as a terrorist organization and a threat 
to domestic security. When dealing with terrorists,  governments use human rights violations as 
one of the counterterror policies(Stohl 2006:60).Through discourses Febres Cordero was able to 
create the impression of a widespread domestic security crisis that required “exceptional 
measures” (Cardenas 2004). The goals are two-fold; to align with the donor’s aims in order to 
increase foreign aid and justify the use of repression to eliminate the security threat.   
 
(2) Expansion of Military Resources & Capacity 
The subsequent step in the mechanism is the expansion of military resources and 
capacity. This is composed of two progressions; first the donor government increases aid 
allocation for military purposes which enables the expansion of the capacity of the recipient 
regime’s security machinery. Once the political discourse established that the Ecuadorian 
government was engaged in a broader transnational war (against terrorism and drugs) at the local 
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level, it justified the increased request and allocation of U.S. aid for military purposes. The 
foreign aid was used to expand the capacities of the Ecuadorian military and police which 
enabled more pervasive repression. Examples that aid is allocated for militaristic purposes 
include joint military exercises or planning as well as sharing of technology and intelligence 
among others, altogether they enable the military and police in the recipient country to use 
repression on a wider scale(Regilme Jr. 2014a:35).  The implementation of these activities is 
costly, especially for developing countries; therefore these security operations would not be 
possible without the support of the aid from the donor country(Regilme Jr. 2014a:35).   
 
(3)  Removal of Ideological Opponents 
This tactic is ultimately used as a means for the elected recipient government to enhance 
domestic authority and survival of the administration. Removal of ideological opponents refers 
to the acts of state repression that are used to oust political opponents. Political opponents 
include a broad range of dissidents including guerillas, social groups such as student and labor 
unions, political parties and officials as well as elites. The process is composed of internal 
actions within the government apparatus as well as external responses to domestic political 
opponents. Internally, tactics used include replacing key government personnel that are a part of 
the opposition, hindering the legislative process and abuse of executive powers among others. 
Externally it refers to the systematic implementation of state violence in order to get rid of all 
political opponents, even those who are peaceful dissidents(Regilme Jr. 2014a:37). This occurs 
when the recipient government brands both armed and peaceful protesters as a threat to the 
domestic security. Weak governments bolster repression with laws and policies that support the 
counter-terror agenda. The purpose of these policies are to provide the state with a broad and 
flexible scope to define the security threat, carry out violent repression against both violent and 
peaceful political opponents and expansion of the state security machinery(Regilme Jr. 
2014a:39). Altogether these new laws and policies enable to the government to purge the 
opposition and consolidate power domestically to establish the radical economic reforms.  
 
4. RESEARCH METHODS 
This thesis will utilize theory-building process-tracing and congruence testing to analyze 
if the proposed causal mechanisms are plausible. I will use a within-case study to show the 
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variation in the human rights situation before and after the presidency of León Febres Cordero. 
The theory-building process tracing method will be used take the empirical evidence and follow 
a “structured analysis” to identify “plausible hypothetical causal mechanisms” between U.S. aid 
and human rights(Beach and Pedersen 2013:16). Congruence testing will be used to evaluate 
whether the hypothesized causal mechanisms from the proposed framework are present. I follow 
Bennett and George’s congruence testing method that treats theory testing in a systematic way to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the findings. First, I will establish the existence of the 
independent and the dependent variables. Then, I will examine if the causal mechanisms in the 
proposed theory are present and functioned as predicted. This will provide a complementary 
basis for causal inference(Bennett and George 2005:224). Since this a “most-likely” case, I make 
causal predictions about the empirical evidence that will prove if the causal hypotheses:  
 
Security Discourse Appropriation: Is there evidence of militaristic discourse that result 
in increased security or counter-terrorism policies? Was there a transformation of the Ecuadorian 
security context which called for changes in policy priorities? Did these policies reflect the 
broader U.S. foreign policy interests? Are there actual policy outcomes which codify these 
convergent political interests? 
 
Expansion of Military Resources & Capacity: Was the U.S. aid for military militaristic 
purposes increased? Is there evidence that the Ecuadorian security apparatus expanded its 
capacities?  Is there evidence of joint-military exercises or planning or sharing of technology and 
intelligence or development projects carried out by the military?  Is there evidence of “bilateral 
collaboration”, meaning did the U.S. allowed the Ecuadorian government to determine the 
objects of state repression because of the security threat?  
 
Removal of Political Opponents: Is there evidence of extrajudicial killings torture, 
imprisonment, illegal arrests, forced disappearances, forceful restriction or violent dispersal of 
mass gatherings by the Ecuadorian military or police(Regilme Jr. 2014a:38)? Were these human 
rights violations inclusive of both armed and unarmed individuals?  
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If the outcomes are consistent with the predictions of the proposed explanatory model, 
then I will entertain the possibility that a causal relationship may exist(Bennett and George 
2005:181).  
The type of data used will be both quantitative and qualitative due to the nature of the 
study. A small-N analysis of statistics on human rights violations and USAID during the 1980’s 
will be used to measure and compare the fluctuations(Callaway and Matthews 2008:65).  Given 
that data on human rights violation may be misleading(Goldstein 1986:624), to overcome the 
limitations, qualitative data will be utilized to provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationships and processes between USAID and human rights. Quantitative data on human 
behavior and motivation cannot be measured and predicted as precisely as phenomena in 
science(Goldstein 1986:608). Therefore qualitative data will give context and significance to the 
data. Both primary and secondary data will be used to substantiate qualitative data and 
arguments. Primary sources will include unclassified government documents, presidential 
speeches, a truth commission report, reports by NGOs, newspaper articles and government 
databases. Secondary sources include historical texts, newspaper articles, human rights reports, 
academic analyses from journals.   
Data on human rights violations is difficult to gather since most states are not interested 
in disclosing this information(Duvall and Stohl 1988). Generally truth commissions provide the 
most comprehensive accounts of human rights abuses perpetrated by states (Sikkink 2004). 
Therefore, human rights violations data will be collected from the Comisión de la Verdad, a truth 
commission spearheaded by the Ecuadorian government. Reports from nongovernmental 
organizations will also be used for validation. Given that the truth commission took place under a 
government which is ideologically opposed to Febres Cordero’s right wing administration, I 
utilize triangulation of various sources to corroborate the figures. Including reports by the 
Americas Watch, the Andean Commission of Jurists’ and CEDHU cited in a U.S. report, which 
organizations not affiliated with the current Ecuadorian government. I will also cross validate all 
other facts with different historical sources that have a broad range of motivations, in both 
Spanish and English, for more accurate and reliable findings.  
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5. CASE STUDY: ECUADOR 1984-1992 
5.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this section is to establish the existence of the independent and dependent 
variables.  The main finding is that the financial support from the U.S.  bolstered the regime 
consolidation and economic reform of the León Febres Cordero government. I argue that an 
increase in U.S. aid to a weak Ecuadorian government that sought to radically establish 
neoliberalism and regime survival (independent variable) led to an increase in human rights 
violations from 1984-1988 (dependent variable). For comparison, a presentation of the human 
rights situation from 1988 to 1992 demonstrates a decline in human rights violations. This is in 
part attributed to President Osvaldo Hurtado, who displayed more pro-human rights discourse 
and made efforts to close down several of the “special” security groups that had been accused of 
human rights abuses during the Febres Cordero presidency. The comparison underscores that the 
increase in human rights violations was a distinct feature of the Febres Cordero government and 
its policies.   
 
5.2 Independent Variable: Economic Ideological Alignment 
This section aims to establish the presence of the independent variable, economic 
ideological alignment. The component parts of the term have been divided into two sections: 
transnational and domestic factors. Transnational factors include the Cold War impact on 
Ecuador and the increase of USAID. The domestic factors are comprised of a weak domestic 
government and the institution of radical neoliberal reforms. Altogether these factors generated 
the conditions for the Febres Cordero administration to choose state repression as a means of 
advancing its political agenda.  
 
5.2.1 Transnational Factors: Cold War Impact on Ecuador & U.S. Aid  
 During the Cold War the United States wanted to ensure that its neighbors to the South 
were on its side. Within the broader scope of the Cold War the U.S. was also fighting a War on 
Terror, in the Middle East, and a War on Drugs in Latin America.  During the Ronald Reagan 
administration from 1981-1989, these smaller wars were linked to the broader Cold War context. 
In his “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations” on January 
16, 1984 Reagan stated: 
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“Independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking 
to dominate by threatening attack or subversion. Most of these conflicts 
have their origins in local problems, but many have been exploited by the 
Soviet Union and its surrogates.”(Reagan 1984a).  
 
 
 At the crux of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy was a shift towards a more 
militaristic approach because of the ongoing transnational wars. During his presidency, Reagan’s 
security discourse created a global state of uncertainty with a collection of military crises that 
spanned the world.  
Latin America was a frontline for the war against Communism and the War on Drugs.  In 
the 1960’s foreign aid to Latin America was the top priority for U.S. government, through the 
Alliance for Progress, U.S. aid was used to ensure there were no Anti-U.S. or Pro-Communism 
movements(Taffet 2007:2). The U.S. was accused of ignoring the mass human rights violations 
of the right-wing governments it supported or directly placed in power by continuing to provide 
those governments with aid(Taffet 2007:8-9).  Despite the emphasis on human rights from the 
Carter administration, these patterns of aid allocation continued into the 1970’s (Carleton and 
Stohl 1985). Reagan purposefully sought to depart from the Carter administration foreign policy 
on human rights, which he accused of allowing Latin American countries including Grenada, 
Nicaragua and Cuba to fall into Communist hands(Kirkpatrick 1981:29).These events were 
viewed as Soviet expansion in the area, which was a threat to U.S. dominion and security in the 
region.   
Almost all public statements of the Reagan administration denounced the Carter 
administration for being “overly sensitive” to human rights violations and decidedly announced 
the implementation of a less human rights oriented policy(Hofrenning 1990:523). Reagan’s 
policy was to adhere to the “Kirkpatrick doctrine” which contended that, “ ‘totalitarian’ Marxist 
regimes should be treated differently than ‘authoritarian’ dictatorships of the right, which were 
said to be less repressive, more susceptible to change and better for American interests.,” (Jacoby 
1986:1067). One of Reagan’s first appointments was Ernest Lefever, as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, who had it made known publicly that he 
believed that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. to promote human rights abroad(Jacoby 
1986:1066). In between Reagan’s election and inauguration there were mass human rights 
violations in Haiti, South Korea and El Salvador. A coalition of U.S. clerics expressed that 
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around the world countries with military governments had interpreted Reagan’s election as 
having given the “green light” to commit human rights violations(Jacoby 1986:1068). Reagan’s 
shift away from the promotion of human rights and towards more militaristic foreign policy 
objectives impacted the global landscape, especially in countries that served as the frontlines for 
these wars.  
In addition to the ongoing Cold War, the Reagan administration waged two other regional 
wars; a War on Terror in the Middle East and an Anti-Narcotics campaign in Latin America. In 
his first news conference, U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig announced that, "international 
terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate of abuses 
of human rights." (Jacoby 1986:1069). This statement set the tone for the U.S. approach towards 
human rights in the context of a battle against international terrorism. Ecuador declared it had a 
local terrorist group thereby joining the international War on Terrorism. Concurrently, the War 
on Drugs in Latin America primarily took place in countries where the majority of drug 
production and trafficking took place. Drug traffickers were labeled “organized domestic 
terrorists” and the situation was treated under principles of terrorism(Hanratty and Weil 
1991:207). Despite being located in between Colombia and Peru, drug cultivation and trafficking 
was less of an issue in Ecuador(Hanratty and Weil 1991:243). Nevertheless, given its proximity, 
Ecuador participated in the Anti-Narcotics campaign of the Reagan administration.  Ecuador’s 
involvement in these wars and support for U.S. foreign policies would justify the significant 
increase in USAID from 1984-1987. The graph on the following page, illustrates patterns in 
USAID from 1980 to 1990.  
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Figure 3. USAID Aid Allocations for Ecuador 1981-1990. (Source: USAID Greenbook). 
 
As Figure 3 shows, during the presidency of León Febres Cordero there were significant 
increases in USAID. Before Febres Cordero’s presidency, U.S. aid was $72.8, $85 and $92.5 
million in 1981, 1982, and 1983 respectively. During these years aid increased in small 
increments of less than $10 million. In 1984 U.S. Aid to Ecuador was about $103 million, then in 
1985 it jumped to $166 million, in 1986 it peaked at $181 million and in 1987 it decreased to 
$127 million (USAID 2017). Between 1984 and 1985, aid increased by 61% in comparison to 
just 11.35% the year before. The aid to Ecuador was allocated for narcotics control, military 
support, security support, economic support, Peace Corps, title I, title II, active grants and other 
USAID assistance programs (USAID 2017). The importance of militaristic objectives is evident 
in the aid allocation for military purposes which increased from 14.8% of the total aid allocation 
in 1983 to 45.7% by 1987 (USAID 2017). The years after the Febres Cordero presidency both 
U.S. aid and the percentage allocated for military purposes decreased. In 1988 aid plummeted to 
$58.3 million of which 7.8% was for military purposes; in 1989 aid was $108.5 million and 
26.1% was for military purposes; and in 1990 aid was 71.3 million of which 18.7% was for 
military purposes(USAID 2017). 
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5.2.2 Domestic Factors: Weak Ecuadorian Government Establishes Radical 
  Neoliberal Reform 
When León Febres Cordero came to power in 1984 he faced the challenge of establishing 
radical neoliberal reforms against the will of the majority of the country. This task was difficult 
given that the government was weak due to external and internal factors.  Externally, Ecuador 
was in the early phases of reinstituting democracy, Febres Cordero had a marginal victory at the 
polls, and there was a deep economic recession(Regilme Jr. 2014a:21).  Within the 
administration issues included an ongoing ideological conflict, insufficient support from the 
elites, and the members of the opposition were the majority in Congress as well as key 
government positions(Regilme Jr. 2014a:21). All these challenges debilitated the Febres Cordero 
regime and his political party, the Frente de Reconstrucción Nacional (FRN).  Febres Cordero 
responded with a, “dictatorial attitude” and instituted, “neoliberal policies that brought the 
executive into sharp conflict with other state powers, especially Congress,” (Ayala Mora 
1991:721). Despite his authoritarian-like behaviors, these challenges would continue to 
undermine the Febres Cordero regime and threaten the survival of the FRN in office.   
The inauguration of León Febres Cordero was the first peaceful transition from one 
democratic government to another in almost 25 years(Washington Post 1984:President 
Inaugurated in Ecuador).  During the 1960’s and 1970’s Ecuador had experienced three military 
coups d’état which resulted in military dictatorships. Democracy was restored peacefully in 1979 
with the election of Jaime Roldós Aguilera. In 1984, Ecuador was still in an early phase of 
restoring democracy and therefore its institutions were weak. The threat of a coup was and 
continues to be a feature of Ecuadorian politics, with the last attempted coup in 2010(BBC News 
2010:Ecuador Declares State of Emergency). Another debilitating factor was that León Febres 
Cordero won by a very small margin in a close electoral race. Febres Cordero ran for the FRN 
proposing neoliberalism to restructure the weak economy (Ayala Mora 1983:338). In the first 
round of the 1984 elections, the Democratic Left and PCD candidate, Rodrigo Borja, received 
24.08% votes and Febred Cordero 23.32%, prompting a second round of elections(Ayala Mora 
1983:339). In the run-off election, with the support of the people in his native Guayaquil as well 
as Ecuador’s powerful business elites, who supported privatization and his anti-state 
campaign(Ayala Mora 1983:92), Febres Cordero secured a narrow victory(Ayala Mora 1983; 
Menéndez-Carrión 1989; Schodt 1987).  
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Furthermore León faced an economic crisis due to Ecuador’s ongoing problem with the 
balance of payments, high unemployment rates and the devaluation of the sucre (the Ecuadorian 
currency). The economic problems stemmed from rapid urbanization, uneven development and a 
growing external debt exacerbated by the loss in oil revenue from the drop in prices. Moreover 
from 1962-1982, the urban population doubled every 15 years, due to rural-urban migration 
stemming from an increase in population and lack of employment in rural areas(Ayala Mora 
1983:131). The chief economic struggle was the declining prices of oil which called for austerity 
measures. Adding to these challenges was the loss of oil due to a natural disaster which meant 
state spending was in deficit(Ayala Mora 1983:342). In Febres Cordero’s view the economic 
crisis in Ecuador had been created by the state-led economic development and the only solution 
was to establish neoliberal reforms.    
Febres Cordero’s economic policies did not improve the situation and this strained his 
relationship with his constituents. In a controversial move, Febres Cordero took away foreign 
trade from the central bank.  This was detrimental, and inflation went from 50% to 70% by 
1988(Ayala Mora 1983:345). He also quickly renegotiated Ecuador’s external debt but was 
unable to negotiate favorable conditions.  One of his first moves was to sign an investment 
agreement with the U.S. agency, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to protect 
foreign investors in Ecuador(Hey 1996:674). This was done to increase foreign direct 
investment, however, results were mediocre because foreigners viewed the domestic political 
situation as unstable(Ayala Mora 1983:341). Ecuador’s GDP continued to suffer, fluctuating 
between 4.2-2.2% between 1984 and 1988(Ayala Mora 1983:87). Low-income communities  
were the most widely affected which resulted in 6 national strikes during the presidency(Ayala 
Mora 1983:93). Public discontent grew over the term of his presidency and the widespread 
dissatisfaction was evident in the 1988 elections. 
The government was also weakened by the ongoing ideological division between 
socialism and neoliberalism. From the 1960’s onwards the Ecuadorian state lead economic 
planning and industrialization(Ayala Mora 1983:119). The move towards socialism was a threat 
to U.S. interests and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in installing a military 
dictatorship from 1963-1966, whose main aim was to get rid of leaders of the left, unions, 
universities(Ayala Mora 1983:156). However in 1972 there was a left-leaning military coup, the 
ruling dictatorship implemented reforms for agriculture and established social benefits programs 
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to overcome inequality(Ayala Mora 1983:69). This dictatorship lasted until 1979 when Jaime 
Roldós, the left-leaning candidate was democratically elected. The tide turned again when Febres 
Cordero, the right-wing candidate, was elected. However, he did not have a majority in Congress 
and members from the opposition were also in key positions, Febres Cordero responded with 
coercion.  
Early in his presidency Febres Cordero showed his willingness to use the armed forces as 
a means of exerting his will. For example when the new Supreme Court leaders were chosen by 
Congress, León ordered the armed forces to surround the Supreme Court building to prevent 
them from taking their posts(Fellner, Gimbel, and García-Sayán 1988:6). He negotiated to have 
Supreme Court judges of his liking assume the posts instead. With this action the Congress lost 
power and Febres Cordero was able to gain more control(Ayala Mora 1983:340). León’s 
relationship with the legislative branches of government was strained for the remainder of his 
term. He continually fought with Congress and the judiciary over the scope of presidential 
powers becausee the President of the Supreme Court was from the opposition and Congress was 
controlled by the rival left-party(Fellner et al. 1988:6). Febres Cordero was accused of sending 
paid mobs into Congress and having the police fired tear gas into the air duct of the Capitol to 
force an evacuation(Fellner et al. 1988:8). Over the course of his presidency León Febres 
Cordero made 26 laws without the approbation of Congress, mainly economic(Ayala Mora 
1983:341).         
 There was continual push back from various factions of the government, to curtail Febres 
Cordero’s actions. Two years after the start of his tenure, in June 1986 the opposition party won 
the majority of the seats in Congress at the midterm elections(Ayala Mora 1983:346). Later that 
year, there was a conflict between Frank Vargas Pazzos, the head of the Armed Forces and 
Febres Cordero’s Minister of Defense, Luis Pineiros - which resulted in a fight between the 
armed forces and military(Ayala Mora 1983:345). As a consequence of confronting the 
government, Frank Vargas Pazzos was incarcerated. This led to the Secuestro de Taura (the 
Taura kidnapping), in which León and a few of his officials were kidnapped by Armed Forces in 
retaliation for Vargas’ imprisonment. There was a negotiation to free Vargas from prison in 
exchange for León’s liberation(Ayala Mora 1983:346). León was freed upon the condition that 
he sign an amnesty agreement, however afterwards he broke his commitment and the participants 
were sentenced to 16 years in prison, the harshest sentence(Ayala Mora 1983:347). After the 
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Secuestro de Taura, Congress tried to initiate impeachment proceedings but was only able to 
pass a resolution asking for Febres Cordero’s resignation. His administration struggled as his 
appointed officials were accused of various crimes of corruption. In 1987 Minister of 
Government, Luis Robles, was accused of human rights violations and Congress voted to 
discharge him despite objections from Febres Cordero(Ayala Mora 1983:347). The 
fragmentation, scandals and lack of internal support from Congress further destabilized Febres 
Cordero’s regime. 
 
5.2.3 Economic Ideological Alignment 
Even before his presidency, León Febres Cordero was a staunch supporter of 
neoliberalism and publicly denounced left-wing political leaders and their policies. Overall 
Febres Cordero’s foreign policy was regarded as having, “a preference for bilateralism and closer 
ties to the United States,” (Hanratty and Weil 1991:199). While León was a longtime supporter 
of free markets, his preference for closer ties meant he also supported other U.S. policies. In 
1986 León was, “praised by Mr. Reagan for his endorsement of free enterprise and for standing 
firm against the 'violent, insidious forces’ of narcotics trafficking and international 
terrorism,”(Weinraub 1986). That same year, a partly declassified CIA memorandum 
demonstrated the ideological alignment, they described his leadership as having, “conservative 
policies that frequently have been closely aligned with U.S. interests,”(1986:1).  
The implementation of neoliberal policies was a commitment to Capitalism and U.S. 
interests. In January 1986, when León visited Washington, Reagan publicly called him “an 
articulate champion of free enterprise” (Zuckerman 1986:484).There was a publicly stated 
affinity between the two administrations which stemmed from the alignment in economic 
systems.  
 
“The coincidences on many of our points of view over the destinies of our 
countries and of the whole hemisphere, have allowed us to leave formalities 
aside and enable us to have clear and frank exchange of views.” –Ronald 
Reagan (The American Presidency Project 1986).  
 
When describing the relationship Reagan stated, “holding high the light of liberty and 
freedom, the people of our two countries can and should and will stand together,“(The American 
Presidency Project 1986). Febres Cordero’s actions in opposing Communism were seen as 
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favorable to U.S. interests. Reagan also praised Febres Cordero for his support of U.S. foreign 
policy as demonstrated by breaking diplomatic relations with Nicaragua(Zuckerman 1986:484). 
During the visit, Reagan called León Febres Cordero a “model leader”(Weinraub 1986).  
Furthermore, at the meeting, Ecuadorian and U.S. officials, “repeatedly underlined their two 
presidents’ total agreement on economic and political matters,” (Hanratty and Weil 1991:199). 
However Febres Cordero’s implementation of economic reform was a process characterized by 
the repression of any opposition. 
The presidency of León Febres Cordero marked an increase in human rights violations 
perpetrated by the state(Comisión de la Verdad 2010). During this time increased forced entry to 
homes, torture, captured books, persecution and murders were used to further economic 
objectives(Ayala Mora 1983:93).The following section provides supporting evidence that 
demonstrates the increase in human rights violations between 1984 and 1988.  
 
 
5.3 Dependent Variable: Increased Human Rights Violations 1984-1988 
According to the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1987 in Ecuador: 
 
 
“Although mistreatment of detainees was not officially sanctioned, the 
government of Febres Cordero made no clear statement condemning the use 
of excessive force, nor were penal actions taken against police or military 
personnel believed to have taken part in deaths, disappearances, or torture.,” 
–America’s Watch Committee (Hanratty and Weil 1991, 243).  
 
 
 
  From 1984 to 1988 state initiated human rights violation increased significantly during 
the Febres Cordero presidency. As Figure 4. displays on the following page this pattern of 
increased human rights abuses occurred specifically during this time period. 
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Figure 4. Human Rights Violation in Ecuador from 1981-1991. (Sources: Data from 1981-1983 from CIRI 
Human Rights Data and from 1984-1991 from Comisión de la Verdad, pg. 55
2
). 
  
In the years before Leon Febres Cordero there were between four and fourteen state-
initiated human rights violations each year. The graph indicates that increasingly the government 
resorted to state repression beginning in 1984.  In 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1987 there were 14, 49, 
82 and 167 violations committed respectively each year(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:55).  
 
Human  Rights  Violations  in Ecuador  1984-1988 
Torture 275 
Extrajudicial Killings 32 
Attempted Homicide 12 
Forced Disappearances 9 
TOTAL 328 
Figure 5. Classification of Human Rights Violations in Ecuador 1984-1988. (Source: Comisión de la 
Verdad:68). 
                                                          
2
 Utilized because there is no data on human rights violations prior to 1984 in Comisión de la Verdad Report  
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Figure 5. shows the total number of violations classified by type, revealing that the state 
primarily engaged in torture which accounted for 83.8% of the abuses committed.  
Data collected by CEDHU and reported by the U.S. government in their Country Study 
publication corroborates the increase of human rights violations during this time. CEDHU 
maintains that the data collected was not comprehensive since it depended on victims coming 
forward, and its monitors believed cases were underreported(Fellner et al. 1988:20; Hanratty and 
Weil 1991:242). Nevertheless in 1985 there were 59 cases of torture as well as 5 individuals who 
disappeared and died in custody of police or military. There were 40 extrajudicial killings in 
1986 and 34 in 1987- victims were primarily participants of strikes and demonstrations but also 
included several leaders of AVC(Fellner et al. 1988:40; Hanratty and Weil 1991:243). In 1987 
there were 89 cases of brutality and 69 cases of torture, with an additional 20 cases of torture 
reported at the start of 1988(Hanratty and Weil 1991:242). According to CEDHU individuals 
that were suspected of political transgressions were tortured as a means of extracting information 
and confessions(Hanratty and Weil 1991:242). 
In 1988 Americas Watch in conjunction with The Andean Commission of Jurists 
published Human Rights in Ecuador, a report on the situation during the preceding years. Human 
rights abuses and complaints were taken from reports by the Ecumenical Commission of Human 
Rights (CEDHU), the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees (TGC), and the Special Commission 
on Human Rights of the Ecuadorian National Congress. According to the report, “critics 
maintain that the government has deliberately chosen to violate human rights as a method for 
fighting subversion, and, also nonviolent political opponents.,”(Fellner et al. 1988:1). The 
majority of offenses were committed by the national police. It is important to note that the 
national police was under the jurisdiction of Minister of Government, Luis Robles Plaza, who 
was appointed and vehemently defended by León Febres Cordero despite being accused of 
human rights violations(Fellner et al. 1988:10). In 1987 Robles Plaza admitted that the police 
mistreated 6 individuals who had been at anti-government demonstrations and claimed to have 
taken action against the aggressors(Fellner et al. 1988:28). 
It was reported that there were there were 186 and 124 arbitrary arrests in 1986 and 1987 
respectively, of which most were held longer than legally permitted(Fellner et al. 1988:21). In 
1986 there were there were 64 cases of torture and 68 in 1987, while there were 174 cases of 
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police brutality in 1986 and 89 in 1987(Fellner et al. 1988:24).  Several victims corroborate that 
they received medical attention to heal physical evidence of torture(Fellner et al. 1988:25).The 
Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees reported 34 formal complaints for 1985-6 but there were 
17 more which did not meet the formal filing requisites and 62 for 1987(Fellner et al. 1988:24). 
According to CEDHU there were 6 disappearances although Amnesty International reported an 
addition 11 cases(Fellner et al. 1988:35). Furthermore Febres Cordero targeted human rights 
organizations and accused them of being linked to AVC, denouncing that human rights defenders 
were protecting drug traffickers and terrorist(Fellner et al. 1988:65-69). This was to discredit the 
independent human rights organizations that were gathering data and reporting to the 
international community. According to critics, the human rights situation was part of a broader 
pattern of disregard for the law maintained by Febres and his administration(Fellner et al. 
1988:3).  
 
5.4 Human Rights Situation in Ecuador 1988-1992 
 For comparison, I will provide the human rights situation in Ecuador during the 
presidency of Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, which exhibitss a significant decrease in state-initiated 
abuses. This time period was chosen because it immediately follows the Febres Cordero 
presidency and challenges studies (Brinks 2008), which attribute numerous human rights 
violations in Latin America to a weak judiciary system.  
 
Term President 
Number of 
HRV Cases 
Number Of 
HRV Victims 
10/ 1984- 10/1988 León Febres Cordero 65 310 
10/1988 - 10/1992 Rodrigo Borja 10 15 
Figure 6. Total Human Rights Violations during Ecuadorian Presidencies 1984-1992 (Source: Comisión de la 
Verdad, pg. 66). 
 
Figure 6. compares the human rights violation from 1984-1988 and 1988-1992.  During 
the Borja presidency there were 10 separate cases of human rights abuses with a total of 15 
victims. These were classified as 7 cases of extrajudicial killings, 8 of torture and one case of a 
forced disappearance(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:69).  Seven of these cases were the result of 
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military and police operations against AVC and public security(Comisión de la Verdad 
2010:114).   These were residual acts of state repression and not on a scale comparable to the 
León Febres Cordero years. 
In 1988 Rodrigo Borja won the presidency, the majority in Congress and the support of 
many municipalities(Ayala Mora 1983:349). Borja represented the Democratic Left party which 
brought forth an economic agenda of “Ecuadorian Socialism” (Ayala Mora 1983:93).Upon 
taking office the Borja administration publicly announced its, “unequivocal opposition to official 
use of abusive measures,” (Hanratty and Weil 1991:243). First his government negotiated an 
agreement with AVC which resulted in the disarmament of the group in 1991(Comisión de la 
Verdad 2010:69,93). During Borja’s presidency, the Attorney General, Fidel Jaramillo attempted 
to prosecute León Febres Cordero for human rights violations, but it remained a fruitless 
endeavor with no follow up action, showing a lack of political will(Tamayo 1984:3). Critics say 
that there was no genuine cohesive action taken to dismantle the apparatus of repression or 
punish those that had committed the violations(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:38). However, the 
Service of Criminal Investigation (SIC) and the Escuadrones Volantes were discontinued during 
the presidency of Borja as a result of their human rights complaints(Comisión de la Verdad 
2010:235). The Unit of Special Investigations (UIES), which had been established in 1985 by 
Febres Cordero to fight against insurgents, remained although the methods utilized were 
different(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:227). Borja also forgave and released the individuals who 
carried out the Secuestro de Taura (Ayala Mora 1983:350). Although these efforts were 
criticized for not being sufficient, the government made several concerted efforts to improve the 
human rights situation. As the data shows the number of state initiated human rights violations 
dramatically decreased when the conditions for economic ideological alignment were no longer 
present. 
 
6. CONGRUENCE TESTING 
6.1 Security Discourse Appropriation 
I argue that appropriation of global militaristic discourse was utilized as a strategy by the 
León Febres Cordero government to garner  additional resources from the prospective donor 
country- the U.S. Febres Cordero effectively achieved this by borrowing the terms “terrorist” and 
“subversive”, commonly used by Ronald Reagan in his global foreign policy and adapting it to 
30 
 
the local context. By labeling AVC as well as anyone who opposed his policies as “terrorists” 
and “subversives” he linked the domestic situation to the international war on terror in order to 
justify the measures of state repression.   
During the Cold War years, the U.S. was fighting another battle - the War on Terror. In 
1983, U.S. President, Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 138, which de 
facto declared war on guerillas(Arquilla 2012). This document, which primarily remains 
classified, was the administration’s campaign against the Abu Nidal Organization , “the al Qaeda 
of the ‘80s”, which was conducting terrorist attacks on behalf of countries in the Middle East 
(Arquilla 2012).  This war was linked to the Cold War by declaring that the terrorist 
organizations were possibly receiving guidance and support from the Soviet Union(Reagan 
1984b:2). By linking terrorism to the Soviet Union, it created another transnational dimension to 
the Cold War. While Directive 138 is primarily concerned with the protection of American 
citizens it also stated, “We must also seek to ameliorate the subversive effect of terrorism on 
foreign democratic institutions and pro-Western governments”(Reagan 1984b:1).  
In his first presidential address in 1984, León Febres Cordero announced a war against 
Terrorism.  In addition to his commitment to free market reforms getting rid of “all forms of 
terrorism”, was a priority (DeLorean 1984). The scapegoat and perceived threat was the leftist 
guerilla group, Alfaro Vive Carajo! (AVC). At the time, AVC was poorly organized and had 
mainly taken symbolic actions, there was no real threat to justify the widespread anti-terrorism 
campaign declared by the new regime(Krupa 2013:179). In 1986 a CIA memorandum defined 
AVC as a “growing subversive threat” and an “active terrorist group” of about 300-1500 
members(3). However the report clearly states that “it has not attracted widespread popular 
support” and that no political parties were directly associated with the group(CIA1986:3). Febres 
Cordero magnified the presence of a heightening AVC terrorist threat domestically to create a 
state of war and justify special measures. Febres Cordero labeled AVC and any of its supporters 
as an “enemy of the State”.  
Febres Cordero further expanded the “enemies of the State” to include all those against 
the implementation of neoliberal economic policies. In the context of the economic and social 
crisis, labeling political opponents as terrorists was a strategy to legitimate penal action against 
them(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:245). This ambiguous conceptualization enabled more 
individuals to fall under those who could be targeted by the state. In fact, of all the victims 
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during this period only 18.6% were AVC members(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:269). Even 
when most of the leaders of AVC has been killed or imprisoned, the state continued to 
exaggerate the danger of the insurgent groups, to justify the continued persecution of leftist 
political dissidents. With the creation of a terrorist threat, the government was able to legitimate 
the authoritarianism of the armed forces and national police(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:32).  
This terrorist situation provided a context of crisis that would identify a common enemy and 
unite the civil society to support the government. The administration frequently declared states of 
emergencies in provinces or the nation, when responding to opposition demonstrations(Comisión 
de la Verdad 2010:41).  
The discourse of crisis and terrorism was institutionalized through the establishment of 
laws and security organizations to combat national terrorism and drug trafficking that were 
modeled after Reagan’s anti-terrorist policy. The Unit for Anti-Subversive Investigations (UIAS) 
was first established in September 1985(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:225). However in February 
1986 it was established as a formal organization, the Service for Criminal Investigation (SIC), 
through executive order Nº 1601(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:283). The same decree also 
created the Unit for Special Investigations (UIES), a unit within the SIC that was designated for 
the sole purpose of combatting “subversives” and “terrorists”(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:226).  
Although its activities and personnel were clandestine recently declassified archives demonstrate 
that investigations and special operations included not only insurgents but also social groups, 
labor unions, social leaders, political opponents, and human rights groups under the purview of 
the UIES(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:227). While the UIES conducted the investigations and 
schemes for operation, the Group of Interventions and Rescue (GIR) carried out the actual 
physical implementation of the plans created by the UIES(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:228). A 
broad range of groups and individuals were labeled as “subversives” and as such this enabled 
León Febres Cordero to retaliate to any opposition with repression.  
The Febres Cordero administration repressed a broad spectrum of dissidents through the 
escuadrones volantes established under Executive Decree Nº 763 in 1985(Comisión de la 
Verdad 2010:229).  These were special groups of police officers whose purpose was to support 
efforts against militant political organizations such as AVC- they were the primary groups 
accused of abuses. Escuadrones volantes also repressed student demonstrations, workers strikes, 
and dislocated people from their homes and persecuted insurgents - the police denied their 
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existence( Comisión de la Verdad 2010:10;Tamayo 1984). Altogether the SIC, UIES, GIR and 
escuadrones volantes made up the state apparatus that committed the human rights violations, 
and were all formally accused of these abuses by various organizations.  
León was able to increase U.S. aid by creating the misconception of a widespread drug 
and terrorist problem in Ecuador. By declaring from the onset of his presidency a war against 
Terror it enabled him to declare states of emergency which legitimated the use of excessive force 
by the state. This strategy was successful in gaining support from the U.S. which would 
eventually translate to financial assistance for these efforts. According to the U.S. embassy in 
Ecuador,  “the political and economic policies, its counterterrorist efforts, and its strong actions 
in drug eradication and interdictions,” showed support of most features of U.S. foreign 
policy(CIA 1986:6). Advancing the interests of the U.S., León was given free rein to broadly 
define “subversives” and “terrorists” to include any dissidents of neoliberalism. The U.S. 
supported these efforts which is corroborated by the U.S. Department of State which on March 
25, 1988 communicated to the Government of Ecuador: “Your successful campaign against 
terrorism has kept Ecuador an island of peace in South America…we are proud we could be of 
assistance against subversion,” (Krupa 2013:169).  These shared interests resulted in the security 
and economic policy outcomes on the national level. Since there was the initial economic 
ideological alignment, the security discourse appropriation and supporting policies, justified 
increases in U.S. aid. 
 
6.2 Expansion of Military Resources & Capacity 
Having successfully persuaded the Reagan Administration that Ecuador was fighting 
against terrorism and drug trafficking, U.S. aid allocations for military purposes increased. I 
argue that these additional funds were ultimately used to increase the resources and capacities of 
the state security apparatus, which enabled the administration to intensify repression efforts on a 
wider scale. There were also joint-military exercises, training and sharing of technology between 
the two countries. The bilateral collaboration was demonstrated by the Reagan’s administration 
permitting Febres Cordero to freely determine the objects of oppression.  
The appropriation of security discourse took time to disperse on a local and international 
level, therefore increases in aid took place over the course of several years, as the following chart 
illustrates:  
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As Figure 7. indicates, the percentage of total aid allocated specifically for military 
purposes doubled in 1986 and 1987. In the years before and after, military aid allocation was 
roughly 20% of total aid. According the USAID Greenbook, in 1985 there was the introduction 
of a new funding program called, “Economic Support Fund/Security Support 
Assistance”(USAID 2017). The year after, USAID allocated for military purposes doubled from 
19.7% to 40.2%. The increase in total aid was significant because the Ecuadorian economy was 
in crisis and the state consistently had a budget deficit. 
There is evidence that there was joint-training between as well as requests by the 
Ecuadorian government to increase military funds. For example the UIES, dedicated to fighting 
“subversives”, received training at the International Congress on Methods for Scientific 
Investigation and Antiterrorist Fight in the U.S.(Comisión de la Verdad 2010:226).  In 1987 
military aid included Military Apprenticeship Program (MAP) grants for $3million and $650,000 
in International Military Education &Training (IMET), and there were Ecuadorian requests to 
double this amount(Fellner et al. 1988:83). The 1988 budget requested an additional $4.5 million 
in MAP grants and 300,000 in IMET(Fellner et al. 1988:83). Additional material resources also 
Year Percent of USAID for Military Purposes 
1981 20.3% 
1982 19.2% 
1983 14.8% 
1984 19.1% 
1985 19.7% 
1986 40.2% 
1987 45.7% 
1988 7.8% 
1989 26.1% 
1990 18.7% 
Figure 7.  Percent of Total USAID Allocated for Military Purposes. Military Aid includes: Narcotic Control, 
Military Assistance, and Economic Support Fund/Security Support Assistance  program. (Source: USAID 
Green Book).  
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included assistance with controlling the Northern border from terrorist groups and drug 
traffickers.  Technology and intelligence shared primarily consisted of, “vehicles, medical 
equipment, communications items, small arms, and support,” as well as the sale of an At-33 
trainer aircraft (Hanratty and Weil 1991:234). 
 In 1986 a CIA memorandum mentions the possibility of Colombian traffickers linking 
with Ecuadorian terrorists groups. Febres Cordero’s establishment of an anti-narcotics campaign 
and appointment of the Army colonel to oversee implementation, showed its importance(CIA 
1986:4). The National Directorate for Control of Illegal Narcotics reported directly to the 
Minister of Government Luis Robles Plaza, who oversaw other security agencies that committed 
human rights abuses(Hanratty and Weil 1991:242). The Ecuadorian government requested aid 
specifically for their anti-narcotics activities(CIA 1986:4).The U.S. also provided training by the 
U.S. navy and powerboats for the port of Guayaquil to monitor drug-trafficking(Hanratty and 
Weil 1991:244). According the U.S. coca production was eradicated by 1987 with the help of 
two U.S. helicopters that were lent for the efforts(Hanratty and Weil 1991:243). 
In 1986 León Febres Cordero approved "Operation Blazing Trails", a project funded by 
the U.S. for the repairment of roads and bridges. The project consisted of 600 U.S. troops which 
rotated every 2 weeks(Hanratty and Weil 1991:199). Even though it was non-militaristic project, 
other branches of the government were not consulted until after the troops arrive. This decision 
was made solely by the executive branch, Febres Cordero and the Minster of Defense officials, 
when Congress became aware they passed a resolution that called for the withdrawal of the 
troops(Hey 1996:678).  
The U.S. viewed anti-neoliberal opponents as separate threats from terrorists but 
nevertheless supported Febres Cordero in his designation of both as enemies of the state. The 
Febres Cordero government freely labeled all opponents, potential objects of state repression, as 
“subversives” and “terrorists”. A U.S. report states Ecuador had a, “successful drug enforcement 
campaign,” and that, “efforts to counter the terrorist activities of the fledgling guerilla 
organization, Alfaro Vive Carajo, have lately met with some success due police penetrations... 
but he faces growing opposition from leftist political groups,”(CIA 1986:1).  The U.S. was 
tolerant of León labeling all dissidents as terrorist since they were also concerned by the 
presence of neoliberal opposition. After the aid and resources of the state security apparatus were 
expanded, the removal of all ideological opponents was achieved in a variety of ways.  
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6.3 Removal of Ideological Opponents 
 León Febres Cordero was able to successfully advocate for increased U.S. military 
support, which I argue was used to increase the capacity of state repression to remove any and all 
opposition. More specifically this included any individual or organization that threatened his 
regime both internally within the government as well as externally.  At times the excessive force 
also resulted in collateral victims who were mistaken as dissidents.  
From the beginning Febres Cordero had an antagonistic relationship with Congress, 
which would deteriorate over the course of his presidency. As mentioned, in 1984 Febres 
Cordero had the Supreme Court building locked down by the police until Congress chose 
individuals of his liking for the posts.  In September 1987, Congress initiated impeachment 
proceedings for Minister of Government, Luis Robles Plaza, accused of human rights violations 
and abuse of authority. The National Police, which was under the jurisdiction of Robles Plaza, 
issued a manifesto to impede the proceedings and Febres Cordero also publicly denounced the 
impeachment(Fellner et al. 1988:10). Hours after León’s statement, socialist block leader in 
Congress and one of the individuals who interrogated Robles Plaza, Diego Delgado, was 
kidnapped and battered violently by unidentified attackers(Fellner et al. 1988:10).  Delgado 
accused the government, however the administration denied the allegations and vowed to open 
an investigation.   
The refusal of Robles Plaza to step down and Febres Cordero’s refusal to dismiss him 
caused widespread disapproval from civil society. After the impeachment proceedings, people 
took to the streets to protest, culminating in a nationwide strike on October 28(Fellner et al. 
1988:11). The government responded with censorship of the radio and declared a state of 
emergency. The Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees ruled that the impeachment proceedings 
were valid. The national police responded by bombarding the Tribunal’s building with tear gas 
and Robles Plaza remained in his position four months, even after losing the constitutional legal 
battle(Fellner et al. 1988:11). Key officials appointed by León Febres Cordero were formally 
accused of supporting human rights violations. This included Robles Plaza and Governor of 
Guayas, Jaime Nebot, who was accused of witnessing torture(El Telégrafo 2012: El Discurso). 
When the Escuadrónes Volantes were inaugurated, Nebot made the following speech: 
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“You, policemen, have precise orders, clear, you have the moral, legal 
and economic support of the Government. Use the arms because they are 
made for that purpose.  The parrots will come out again to call for human 
rights, but for the human rights of murderers, criminals, terrorists, rapists 
and kidnappers…” (El Telégrafo 2012:El Discurso)3.   
 
Febres Cordero was present at the meeting and did not contradict this statement, which 
was interpreted as his support for the use of force that may have been classified as human rights 
violations.  
Any form of civil dissidence whether armed or unarmed was suppressed by the 
authorities.  The main targets were the armed members of AVC as well as anyone affiliated with 
the group.  In 1985 there were a series of kidnappings and attempts at mobilizing by AVC, 
however most of these efforts were thwarted by the Ecuadorian national police and resulted in 
the torture and execution of AVC members as well as civilians(Krupa 2013:184). In 1985, when 
referring to members of AVC Ecuadorian Secretary of Public Administration, Joffre Torbay 
Dassun, stated “the Subversion has to be killed like turkeys the night before the feast,” (El 
Telégrafo 2012:El Discurso)
4
.  In 1986 AVC’s leader was killed as well as many of its members, 
nevertheless, human rights violations increased from 82 that year to 167 in 1987(Comisión de la 
Verdad 2010:55). Less than 20% of the human rights victims were members of AVC, the other 
80% were from the civilian population. Many of the civilians tortured were falsely accused of 
being members or affiliated with AVC, this included family members of AVC(Comisión de la 
Verdad 2010). 
León Febres Cordero had a combative relationship with social groups. In 1984, he told 
unions to stay out of political life in his acceptance speech from his political party, the FRN 
(Ayala Mora 1983:245).This was supported by the repression of strikes, demonstrations and 
protests. In the beginning of 1985 there was a general strike organized by FUT that was shut 
down violently and according to reports resulted in hundreds of arrests and the death of at least 
five individuals(Zuckerman 1986:487). Febres Cordero deemed the strike illegal and later that 
year in March another general strike was also suppressed. In October 1985 two students were 
                                                          
3
 Original quote in Spanish:  “Ustedes, policías, tienen órdenes precisas, claras; tenéis el respaldo moral, legal y 
económico del Gobierno (...) Usad las armas porque están facultados para ello. Ya saldrán las cotorras nuevamente a 
clamar por los derechos humanos, pero por los derechos humanos de los asesinos, de los delincuentes, de los 
terroristas, de los violadores y de los secuestradores (...)” 
4
 Original quote in Spanish: “…a la subversión hay que matarla como a los pavos a la víspera”. 
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killed by police at a demonstration against transit increases and at a peaceful continent-wide 
protest against debt, protesters were assaulted with batons and teargas by the police(Zuckerman 
1986:487).  
The administration removed political opposition through covert or extralegal methods 
both internally and externally. These tactics ultimately led to an increase in the human rights 
violations between 1984-1988.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 A number of conclusions can be derived from the case of Ecuador, which elucidate but 
also raise further questions on the relationship between human rights and foreign aid. The 
increase in U.S. aid to a weak Ecuadorian government that sought regime consolidation and 
radical economic reform led to an increase in human rights violations in Ecuador from 1984-
1988. This finding contests scholarship on state repression which finds that democracies are less 
likely to repress or that weak judiciary systems in Latin America allow for increased human 
rights abuses. Conversely, it challenges studies that assert that the U.S. considers human rights 
compliance when making aid allocations. This thesis supports what Apodaca & Stohl (1999); 
Callaway and Matthews (2008); Carle and Stohl (1985); and Carleton (1989) argued- political, 
economic and security objectives are prioritized over human rights considerations. If the human 
rights situation in a recipient country depends on transnational and domestic factors how can 
policy-makers prevent an increase in violations? 
The proposed explanatory model provided a series of causal mechanisms to explain this 
deviant case, with the aim of identifying the combination of conditions which led to increased 
human rights violations, in order to prevent such an occurrence. The empirical evidence 
confirmed the existence of each hypothesized causal mechanism, demonstrating congruence with 
the proposed explanatory model. The increase in U.S. aid led to a rise in state-initiated human 
rights violations because the Ecuadorian government was weak and sought to institute 
neoliberalism, an economic ideology that aligned with U.S. interests. 
 The Ecuadorian government chose state repression as a means of consolidating power 
and ensuring the survival of the regime. Concurrently, the U.S. turned a blind eye to the human 
rights situation and continued to increase aid because a neoliberal Ecuador advanced its foreign 
policy objectives. By appropriating the international discourse on terrorism and drugs, Febres 
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Cordero created a state of terror that justified repressive measures and convinced the Reagan 
administration that Ecuador needed more military aid. The increase in military resources and 
capacity was then used to implement repression on a broader scale. Febres Cordero’s removal of 
all political opposition, within and outside the state apparatus resulted in the human rights abuses 
of both armed and unarmed dissidents. This series of processes ultimately resulted in increased 
human rights violations between 1984 and 1988.   
It is important to bear in mind that these findings are limited on various dimensions. One 
challenge was accessing a greater breadth of Ecuadorian primary sources, given the sensitive 
nature of clandestine organizations and operations, these documents were mostly inaccessible. 
Information provided by the U.S. government was greater, although the U.S. Department of State 
only has digital archives starting from 1990. A more extensive time frame would be useful to 
track the variations in the human rights conditions in Ecuador. A comprehensive comparison of 
the Febres Cordero Administration with the preceding and subsequent presidencies, who faced 
many of the same challenges but did not commit human rights violations, would be informative. 
Especially with Rodrigo Borja, 1988-1992, who denounced the human rights violations and 
promoted a less militaristic agenda.  The proposed theoretical framework is meant to explain the 
case of Ecuador but has the potential to be generalizable if more cases are used for comparison. 
This would help assess which components are peculiarities of this particular case and which 
could apply to a more general model. Another limitation, is that rival explanations have not been 
suggested which has been a result of limited space.  
The findings of the explanatory model suggest recommendations for further research on 
foreign aid and human rights. More generally, additional studies can propose causal mechanisms 
for cases in which increase in aid may have led to increased violations. Cases that deviate from 
conventional findings demonstrate the vicissitudes in human rights conditions and it is important 
to identify the specific catalysts of change.  Future research should address the multi-scalar 
conditions under which aid increases violations given that large-N analyses have found 
contrasting results. A theoretical framework is important for structuring and analyzing complex 
processes that are multi-scalar and interactive. Further research can bring forth new models and 
explanations to detect problematic patterns and suggest solutions to prevent the continued human 
rights violations of millions of victims around the globe.  
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